Prior studies identify several motives for why firms release management earnings forecasts (MFs). A common feature of such studies is they pool MFs when drawing inferences about a specific motive. By ignoring the heterogeneous rationales managers have to issue MFs, pooling could lead to biased inferences. To address the issue, we develop an approach that classifies MFs into one of the three rationales: capital market incentives, compliance with Rule 10b-5 to disclose material nonpublic information or abstain from trading, or managerial opportunism. Our classification scheme indicates that 63% of MFs are released to lower the firm's cost of capital, 23% are issued to comply with Rule 10b-5, and 14% are opportunistic. Four sets of tests provide construct validity of our classification scheme. These include replications of earlier studies where we find that our MF classification scheme increases power and changes prior inferences regarding MFs. Classifying MFs into our three MF categories will aid future researchers in constructing better specified and more powerful tests of the economic determinants and consequences of management's decision to issue MFs.
Introduction
The disclosure literature recognizes several different motives to explain why managers provide earnings forecasts (hereafter, MFs). These are: (i) capital market incentives that increase market liquidity and lower the firm's cost of capital by reducing information asymmetry (see, e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991 , Ajinkya and Gift 1984 , Graham et al. 2005 , Frankel et al. 1995 and Coller and Yohn 1997 ; (ii) to allow managers to trade opportunistically in their firm's securities (see, e.g., Noe 1999 , Rogers and Stocken 2005 , and Cheng and Lo 2006 ; (iii) to comply with insider trading regulations under Rule 10b-5 requiring managers with material private information to disclose or abstain from trading (DOA) (see, e.g., Loss and Seligman 2004 , Cheng and Lo 2006 , Rogers 2008 , and Heitzman et al. 2010 and (iv) to reduce expected litigation costs (see, e.g., Skinner 1994 and Lev 1995) . With regard to the third motive, while the securities laws are clear that if insiders want to trade in their firm's securities they must first disclose any material nonpublic information in their possession, securities regulations are far from clear as to what constitutes material nonpublic information. The lack of such clear guidance suggests that MFs are a mechanism for managers to disclose material inside information prior to trading to comply with the securities laws.
For the purpose of this study we define MFs as disclosures issued before the last three weeks of the corresponding fiscal period end. "MFs" refer collectively to "management earnings forecasts," "management guidance," and "management forecasts." Disclosures issued late in a period ("warnings") or after the period end, but before the earnings announcement ("preannouncements") are viewed as disclosures designed to reduce a firm's expected class action damages (iv. above). We focus on the first three motives and exclude from our tests all disclosures that are issued in the last three weeks before the end of the quarter and through the actual earnings announcement date. We do so because managers' rationale to issue "warnings" and "preannouncements" are easy to identify, they are designed to reduce expected class action damages, and such announcements constitute less than 10% of all earnings-related forecasts.
While the disclosure literature recognizes that managers face various incentives to issue guidance, most studies pool all MFs together in a single sample which implicitly assumes that just one particular motive drove managers' disclosure decision. For example, in testing whether MFs increase transparency and lower firms' cost of capital, researchers assume all MFs are issued for that purpose and draw conclusions based on the pooled MF sample. However, this approach ignores important heterogeneity in the origins of MFs because a substantial number of MFs could be released for opportunistic or 10b-5 compliance reasons. Pooling MFs creates at least two problems. First, including MFs that are not issued to lower the firm's cost of capital reduces power, which not only results in lower significance levels, but more seriously could lead to a spurious "no result" when an effect actually exists in the sample. Second, inclusion of MFs issued for 10b-5 compliance reasons introduces a correlated omitted-variables problem that can bias the inferences drawn if variables used to measure cost of capital effects also capture managers' 10b-5 compliance incentives.
Our study addresses the question "Should Guidance Be Pooled?" More specifically, we point out and provide supporting empirical evidence that future MF studies can construct more powerful tests of their hypotheses by focusing specifically on MFs issued for the particular motive the researcher is addressing (e.g., to lower the firm's cost of capital or to comply with 10b-5 requirements). Before describing how we address our research question, some discussion of terminology is warranted. "COC (cost of capital) MFs" to refer to MFs issued by managers because they want to increase transparency by lowering information asymmetry and thereby satisfy investors' and analysts' demand for information. Managers issue "COC MFs" to increase market liquidity which facilitates access to capital markets and lowers a firm's cost of capital.
"DOA (disclose or abstain) MFs" refers to MFs issued because managers wish to trade in their firm's securities and want to comply with Rule 10b-5, and therefore must "disclose or abstain (DOA)" from trading. Finally, "OPP (opportunistic) MFs" refers to MFs issued with the purpose of opportunistically transferring wealth from shareholders to managers. For example, managers sell (buy) shares prior to the release of bad (good) news MFs, or issue optimistic (pessimistic) MFs prior to selling (buying) shares. While all three types of MFs are "voluntary" in the sense that managers have discretion over whether or not to issue them, COC MFs and DOA MFs increase firm value, but in different ways. COC MFs increase firm value by lowering the firm's cost of capital (i.e., denominator effect), whereas DOA MFs increase expected future cash flows by reducing expected insider trading sanctions (i.e., numerator effect).
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To address the question "Should Guidance Be Pooled?" we must first devise a method to classify MFs into mutually exclusive subsets. We do so by using properties of the data which are 1 Since COC MFs can lower the transaction costs associated with of issuing new capital they can also increase expected future cash flows. designed to capture the rationales for why managers issue MFs. While managers gain utility from issuing MFs and/or trading in their firm's stock, a manager's utility is not directly known or observable. Thus, decisions to issue a DOA MF and/or trade in their firm's securities are endogenous and inter-related and researchers cannot observe whether incentives to reduce the cost of capital, compliance with rule 10b-5, or opportunism is driving the decision to issue any particular MF. For example, if a manager withholds material information or releases a biased MF and then trades, the manager's MF is ex ante opportunistic ("biased" MFs are those differing from the manager's private information). However, if a manager discloses an unbiased COC MF, observes the market reaction, and then trades because of his/her conjecture that the market mispriced the news, the manager is behaving opportunistically, but the opportunism is ex post. This is because he/she faithfully (unbiasedly) represented his/her private information via a COC MF and by trading is simply conjecturing the market is wrong. While it is straight-forward to describe these alternative MF scenarios conceptually it is difficult (if not impossible) to empirically identify ex ante opportunism from ex post opportunism because one cannot observe manager's private information or biased disclosures except in rare cases of admitted fraud.
Not knowing managers' exact motives to issue MFs necessitates an indirect approach to classify each MF as COC, DOA, or OPP. We first classify MFs into three mutually exclusive samples based on insider trading around the release of the MF, characteristics of the MF, the market reaction to the MF, and the MF forecast error (details later). Each sample is constructed to contain MFs most likely to have been issued based on one of the three motives we study.
Using a sample of 30,876 MFs from the First Call CIG database from 1998-2010, we classify 63% as COC MFs, 23% as DOA MFs, and 14% as OPP MFs. Thus, while 63% of MFs are classified as issued to reduce cost of capital a substantial portion (37%) is not.
We provide four sets of empirical tests to validate our MF classification scheme. First, we estimate a multinomial probit model of MF disclosure in a given firm quarter using variables designed to capture the cost of capital, DOA, and opportunistic incentives to issue MFs. 2 If our MF classification scheme has construct validity then the variables designed to explain MFs issued for cost of capital, DOA, and opportunistic reasons will have greater explanatory power in their respective sub-sample than in the other sub-samples. As predicted, variables assumed to 2 Multinomial probit is widely used in economics and marketing to model multinomial choice problems (see, e.g., Hausman and Wise 1978 , McCulloch et al. 2000 and Haaijer et al. 2000 . measure cost of capital, DOA, and opportunistic disclosure incentives do have greater explanatory power in their respective MF sub-sample than in the other sub-samples.
Second, we replicate Cheng and Lo (2006) and find that one of their two primary inferences (i.e., managers increase the frequency of bad news MFs prior to insider purchases) holds only in the subsample of MFs that we classify as OPP MFs, but not for MFs classified as COC MFs or DOA MFs. This finding is consistent with Cheng and Lo's (2006) hypothesis that "insiders strategically choose disclosure policies and the timing of their equity trades to maximize trading profits," (p. 815), and it adds construct validity to our MF classification scheme. More importantly, using our OPP MF sample we overturn the other primary inference in their paper. Specifically, while Cheng and Lo (2006) conclude that managers do not adjust forecasting activity before selling shares due to litigation concerns, we find that managers do increase the frequency of good news MFs prior to insider sales.
Third, we find that insider trading associated with DOA and opportunistic MFs exhibits differential predictive ability for future stock returns. If OPP MFs capture those issued by managers motivated to trade opportunistically in their firm's stock, then such insider trading should have predictive ability for future stock returns. On the other hand, if managers issue DOA MFs to disgorge their material nonpublic information before trading, such insider trading should not predict future stock returns. The results support these predictions.
Our fourth and final set of construct validity tests is based on replicating Ajinkya et al. (2005) . There we find that their key results vary in predictable ways across our MF categories.
Our findings have implications for the design of future MF studies as well as for the interpretation of prior research using MFs to test cost of capital disclosure incentives. First, since roughly 37% of MFs do not appear to be made to reduce firms' cost of capital, studies treating all MFs as disclosures designed to reduce the cost of capital misclassify roughly a third of their sample, potentially leading to a loss of power. A loss of power does not call into question prior published papers documenting significant findings. However, published and unpublished MF studies that failed to document significance (and future studies) could be enhanced by limiting their samples to only those MFs (i.e., COC, DOA, or OPP) that are the particular focus of their research question. Second, prior MF papers implicitly assume the independent variables used to predict the issuance of MFs are only capturing cost of capital incentives. A problem, however (discussed later), is that variables used to proxy for cost of capital incentives also capture managerial incentives to issue MFs to satisfy DOA requirements.
This calls into question the reliability of the inferences drawn in prior MF studies about the predicted effects of cost of capital variables.
While our MF classification scheme captures managers' unobservable incentives to issue MFs, we acknowledge that it invariably produces some misclassifications. If misclassifications are random, they reduce the power of our construct validity tests. If they are not random, our inferences about the relative importance of the competing motives to issue MFs will be affected.
This limitation is not unique to our setting. Other research areas such as earnings quality, conservatism, information content of earnings, etc., all require measures of unobservable constructs. The next section describes the relevant literatures, our MF classification scheme, the sample, and the empirical tests.
Literature review
This section summarizes three literatures related to our study: securities regulation requiring managers to disclose material information or abstain from trading, studies of management forecasts, and papers examining the relation between MFs and insider trading.
Management's affirmative duty to disclose material information or abstain from trading
In general, managers have no affirmative duty to disclose material information or events as they occur under the securities laws unless "(1) a Commission statute or rule requires disclosure, (2) an 'insider' …is trading, or (3) a previous disclosure is or becomes inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading" (see Loss and Seligman 2004, p. 3510-3511) . However, if insiders want to trade, Rule 10b-5 prohibits them from doing so unless they first disclose any material private information. Simply put, insiders must either disclose that information or abstain from trading (DOA).
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The firm has a legal duty to disclose material nonpublic information whenever it suspects that persons with access to material inside information may be trading in the company's stock (see Block et al. 1985) . Hence, even though other managers within the firm such as divisional vice presidents do not have direct control over the decision to issue a MF, knowing that such managers have material nonpublic information and plan to trade creates a legal duty for the firm to disclose the material information to comply with Rule 10b-5. 4 The securities laws and SEC regulations offer little clear-cut guidance as to what constitutes material nonpublic information (see Prentice, 1999) . While Staff Accounting Bulletin 99 and Regulation Full Disclosure (Reg FD) list types of information that may help managers determine materiality, Heminway (2003) argues that: "the imprecise existing legal standard defining what is 'material' make it difficult for those issuers, directors and officers to understand their legal obligations." Heminway (2003) Moreover, risk-averse insiders will set a low materiality threshold resulting in the disclosure of some immaterial MFs.
Research on MFs
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Managers' incentives to disclose MFs include signaling good firm performance, reducing litigation risk, facilitating access to capital markets and reducing the cost of capital, and adjusting analysts ' and investors' expectations (see, e.g., Coller and Yohn 1997; Frankel et al. 1995; Verrecchia and Weber 2006; Beyer et al. 2010) . The theoretical disclosure literature predicts that when firms bear proprietary costs from disclosure, or when investors are uncertain about managers' information, managers will disclose good news and withhold unfavorable news (Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985 a and b; Verrecchia 2001, Evans and Sridhar, 2002) . Early studies on MFs are consistent with these predictions (see, e.g., Penman 1980; Lev and Penman 1990) . 4 Most firms have insider trading policies: prohibiting all employees from trading in the firm's securities while in the possession of material nonpublic information, requiring pre-clearance for trades by officers and directors, and establishing normal trading windows. Bettis et al. (2000) report that roughly 75% of their 626 sample firms have policies where insider trades must be approved by the company. 5 The MF literature is vast so we make no attempt to discuss it in detail. We restrict attention to papers most closely related to our study (see Healy and Palepu, 2001 , Hirst et al, 2008 , and Beyer et al, 2010 for reviews).
Litigation risk has also been advanced as an explanation for why managers issue MFs. Healy and Palepu (2001, p.422-23) conjecture that litigation risk can affect managers' disclosure choices in two opposing ways: "first, legal actions against managers for inadequate or untimely disclosures can encourage firms to increase voluntary disclosure. Second, litigation can potentially reduce managers' incentives to provide disclosure, particularly of forward-looking information." Consistent with the former, Skinner (1994) finds that MFs are more likely to preempt bad news earnings surprises to reduce expected shareholder litigation cost. Healy and Palepu's second conjecture (i.e., litigation reduces managers' incentives to provide forwardlooking information) is based on the premise that managers fear being (legally) penalized for forward-looking information (e.g., MFs) made in good faith that is inaccurate ex post. While this conjecture may be true, it ignores the fact that DOA rules require managers to release forwardlooking information (e.g., MFs) prior to trading in their firm's securities. 6 The DOA rationale for managers' to issue MFs is not the same as the traditional litigation risk hypothesis examined in the literature (e.g. Skinner, 1994) . Under the usual litigation risk explanation, managers issue MFs to preempt significant bad news earnings surprises to reduce the expected cost of shareholder lawsuits that would be triggered by the potential price plunge in the absence of a prior MF. Under DOA, managers issue MFs prior to trading in their firm's securities to avoid SEC investigations and sanctions, and such MFs are not restricted to just conveying significant bad news as in Skinner (1994) . In fact, to avoid allegations of insider trading the DOA motive for releasing a MF would predict that managers will disclose their private information through MFs, regardless of the sign of the news and the direction of the transaction. Moreover, as it is more likely to establish insiders' personal gains when there are actual trades, managers would be more sensitive to the materiality level of the news and potentially lower their disclosure materiality threshold. Rogers (2008) recognizes that managers wishing to trade have a legal duty to disclose or abstain from trading. He examines three corporate disclosures (MFs, conference calls, and IPO press releases) and finds evidence that managers' incentives affect the quality of information provided to market participants. In particular, managers provide higher quality disclosures prior to selling shares than are provided in the absence of trading. Rogers (2008) also reports lower quality disclosures prior to purchasing shares than in the absence of trading, presumably to maintain their information advantage. While Rogers (2008) recognizes all three motives for managers to issue MFs (COC, OPP, and DOA), his focus differs from ours. He examines how the various incentives affect disclosure quality (as measured by the market reaction to the disclosure), but does not test how the various incentives affect the decision to issue a MF, which is the focus of our paper.
The empirical MF literature typically assumes that firms make separate and independent guidance decisions each period (see, e.g., Hirst et al. 2008 and Tang 2011) . Leuz and Verrecchia (2000, p. 94 ) distinguish between a "disclosure commitment" and a "disclosure" in that "the former is a decision by the firm about what it will disclose before it knows the content of the information (i.e., ex ante), whereas the latter is a decision by the management made after it observes the content (i.e., ex post)." Presumably, firms adopt ex ante MF commitment policies to reduce information asymmetry and lower the firm's cost of capital (see Core 2001) . However, managers do not disclose the existence of ex ante MF commitment policies and the literature does not provide a generally accepted method to identify these ex ante commitment MFs (Tang, 2011) . To enhance comparability with prior MF research our main tests do not differentiate between ex ante MF commitment policies and ex post MFs. We recognize that ex ante commitments to issuing MFs may be those firms where disclosure theory more strongly predicts reductions in information asymmetry, and hence potential cost of capital benefits. The inclusion of both ex ante policy-determined and ex post non-policy driven MFs in our COC MF sample might reduce the power of our tests, but imparts no obvious bias. As a sensitivity test we employ Tang's (2011) method to remove ex ante commitment policy-driven MFs from our sample and find that our inferences are robust (see section 5.3.5). Noe (1999) and Cheng and Lo (2006) address the relation between insider trading and MFs. Both document that managers buy more shares following bad news MFs than after good news MFs, and sell more share after good news MFs than after bad news MFs, results that both studies interpret as evidence of managers opportunistically timing their insider trading vis-à-vis their MF disclosure. Noe (1999) studies insider trading before and after the release of MFs to investigate whether managers are opportunistic ex ante in the sense that they trade to exploit the information revealed by the subsequent MF. The evidence is inconsistent with such ex ante opportunism. Noe (1999) also investigates how managers trade after the release of MFs and finds they generally behave like contrarians -they buy if the stock price reaction to the MF is negative or sell if the reaction is positive. Noe (1999) focuses exclusively on whether managers behave strategically when they trade before or after MFs, which means he does not consider that managers could be issuing MFs to comply with DOA rules. Noe's (1999) finding of significant trading following MFs is consistent with managers' issuing MFs to comply with DOA rules.
Research jointly examining MFs and insider trading
Under this interpretation, insiders trade after disclosing a MF because it means they have disclosed their material information prior to trading as required by rule 10b-5. 
Summary
The literature reviewed above leads to the following conclusions. First, the literature has identified three primary reasons why managers issue MFs: cost of capital incentives, their affirmative "disclose or abstain" duty under the securities laws, and to opportunistically time their insider trading vis-à-vis the disclosure of their MFs. Second, while the securities laws are clear that if insiders want to trade in their firm's securities they must first disclose any material nonpublic information, the regulations are far from clear as to what constitutes material nonpublic information. The lack of such guidance suggests that MFs are a mechanism for managers to disclose material inside information prior to trading to comply with the securities laws. In the next section, we develop a method to sort MFs into one of three mutually exclusive 7 Another interpretation of Noe's (1999) results is managers are strategic ex post, but not ex ante in that they issue a MF to reduce cost of capital, and only decide to trade after they observe the market response to the MF. Here, the ex ante act of issuing the MF could be unrelated to the ex post decision to trade. 8 Other papers in the opportunistic category are Aboody and Kasznik (2000) (CEOs opportunistically time MFs to maximize stock option compensation) and Rees et al. (2008) which finds managers provide more pessimistic guidance prior to stock option awards than afterwards. categories based on the manager's likely incentives (COC, DOA, or OPP) and then describe how we validate this classification scheme.
Classifying MFs based on manager's incentives
To address the question ("Should Guidance Be Pooled?") we need a method to sort MFs.
The classification scheme is driven by the three explanations offered in the literature and discussed in section 2 for why managers issue MFs (cost of capital incentives, compliance with insider trading regulations, and opportunistic insider trading incentives). We begin by organizing MFs into three mutually exclusive and exhaustive samples based on properties of MFs and insider trading patterns (details in section 3.1). These samples are: (i) MFs where, a priori, the data suggest they were issued to lower the firm's cost of capital (COC), (ii) MFs where, a priori, the data suggest that managers are likely to have had an affirmative duty to disclose material information (DOA), and (iii) those MFs where, a priori, the data suggest they were issued because the manager traded opportunistically (OPP). As in numerous other areas in the accounting literature where managers' true motives are unobservable we must develop variables to proxy for the alternative explanations for why managers issue MFs. Managers issue DOA MFs because they believe they are in possession of material nonpublic information and want to trade for personal liquidity reasons, to diversify, or to accumulate shares. Liquidity reasons include paying college tuition bills, income taxes, divorce settlements, buying homes, or exercising options (to pay the exercise price and taxes). Managers may also want to purchase shares because they believe the stock is undervalued and they want to credibly signal undervaluation or to meet share ownership guidelines imposed by their firm.
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To comply with securities laws managers have an affirmative duty to disclose material information prior to trading. Managers only must disclose material nonpublic information before they trade. The more "material" a manager's private information, the more likely the manager perceives he/she has an affirmative duty to disclose, and hence is more likely to issue a MF.
MFs issued to comply with 10b-5 sanctions may have large (positive or negative) stock price effects. However, as noted in section 2.1, there is little clear-cut guidance in the securities laws or SEC regulations as to what constitutes material information. This may lead risk-averse managers to set a low materiality threshold and disclose some DOA MFs that trigger small stock price effects.
Based on the requirements underlying DOA rules, all MFs followed by insider trading are candidates for inclusion in the DOA sample. However, as discussed in detail below, some MFs that are followed by insider trading can reliably be classified as opportunistic (see steps Ob and Oc below). MFs in the DOA sample consist of those that are followed by insider trading not otherwise classified as opportunistic. MFs preceded by insider trading are not candidates for the DOA MF sample because DOA requires disclosure before not after trading. We assign MFs to the DOA sample based on the following criteria:
Da: All MFs with insider trading (i.e., either selling or buying) in the 30 days after the MF's release date except those classified as opportunistic (see Ob and Oc below).
MF classification scheme: MFs issued opportunistically (OPP MFs)
Managerial opportunism manifests itself in several ways: 1) insider selling prior to the release of bad news; 2) insider buying prior to the release of good news; 3) issuing optimistic
MFs prior to selling shares; or 4) issuing pessimistic MFs prior to buying. Based on this intuition we assign MFs to the opportunistic sample using the following criteria:
Oa: Insider purchasing in the 30 days prior to release of good news MFs (abnormal returns at MF release date > 0%) or insider selling in the 30 days prior to release of bad news MFs (abnormal returns at MF release date < 0%), OR Ob: At the MF release date, the manager issues an optimistic MF (i.e., MF -Actual Earnings > 0), which triggers a large positive stock price reaction (i.e., abnormal return ≥ 5%), and there is insider selling (i.e., opportunistic selling) in the next 30 days, OR Oc: At the MF release date, the manager issues a pessimistic MF (i.e., MF -Actual Earnings < 0), triggering a large negative stock price reaction (i.e., abnormal return ≤ -5%), and there is insider buying (i.e., opportunistic buying) in the next 30 days.
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Our MF classification scheme invariably misclassifies some MFs. For example, not all
MFs classified by step Oa were necessarily opportunistic. In some cases managers may trade (ex ante) with no intention of issuing a subsequent MF because they do not believe they are in possession of material nonpublic information. However, after they trade they may learn a material fact so they disclose it via a MF and this disclosure results in a large stock price reaction. Thus, by chance the MF announcement abnormal return was positive, the insider sold, and the MF was misclassified as an OPP MF. Likewise, some COC MFs may be misclassified.
Suppose a manager issued a biased MF in hopes of trading opportunistically (i.e., he/she issued an optimistic MF before selling). After issuing the MF the manager observes a market reaction that is smaller than expected, making it unprofitable to sell. Such possibilities imply that our sample of COC MFs may contain some MFs issued opportunistically ex ante, but which did not result in any insider trading ex post. Such misclassifications reduce the power of our tests to validate our MF classification scheme.
Another potential source of misclassification arises from the SEC's October 2000 Rule 10b5-1 that provides an affirmative legal defense against civil and criminal penalties to insiders 11 Replacing the ±5% cutoffs in Ob and Oc with ±3% and ±10% cutoffs does not alter the inferences. 
Sample selection
We start with 304,275 firm-quarters from First Call from 1998 to 2010. Securities regulation and exchange listing requirements require prompt disclosure of material information whenever a company suspects persons with access to inside information may be trading in the company's stock (see Block et al. 1985) . Because a firm has a duty to disclose material information if it knows insiders wish to trade, we include insider trading of all top executives (not just the CEO and CFO). Our definition of insider trading includes all open market purchases or sales by the CEO, CFO, Chairman, President, Executive VP or Senior VP.
We define a "good" ("bad") news MF as one with a positive (negative) two-day (i.e., day 0 and +1) market-adjusted stock return (CAR). MFs with CARs greater than 5% in absolute value are designated "large news" MFs. We calculate MF forecast errors by subtracting the MF from actual EPS. Positive (negative) values indicate management pessimism (optimism).
Results
Frequencies of COC MFs, DOA MFs, and OPP MFs
The results in Table 1 Table 1 are conditional on the accuracy of our classification scheme, sections 5.3 -5.6 provide a series of validation tests. Before reporting the results of those tests, we first provide some summary statistics about the three MF sub-samples. Anilowski et al. (2007) to classify MFs into good, bad, neutral, and mixed "news," we find that OPP MFs have a higher concentration of "bad news" (54%) than DOA MFs (44%), and COC MFs (51%). It is not surprising that OPP MFs have a higher proportion of bad news because from the insider trading literature we know that insiders sell more frequently than they buy, and from Table 1 we see that about 80% of MFs classified as OPP are generated by step Oa, which classifies MFs as opportunistic if there are insider sales in the 30 days prior to the MF, and the MF is bad news.
Descriptive statistics
First construct validity test of the MF classification scheme: Multinomial probit model
Our first construct validity test of our MF classification scheme (others are described in sections 5.4 -5.6) is a model designed to predict whether a particular type of MF (COC, DOA, or OPP) is issued in a firm-quarter based on the premise that throughout a given quarter managers continuously decide whether to issue a MF and whether to trade in their firm's securities. Simply stated, managers gain utility from issuing MFs and/or trading in their firm's stock. While the manager selects the option generating the highest utility, one cannot observe the manager's utility for each alternative, only the outcome (i.e., the manager's actual choice) is observed.
Conceptually, manager m's utility from selecting option k (µ mk ) can be expressed as:
where COC m is a vector of variables capturing cost of capital incentives (coc 1 , coc 2 , …), DOA m is a vector of variables capturing disclose or abstain incentives (doa 1 , doa 2 , …), OPP m is a vector of variables capturing opportunism incentives (opp 1 , opp 2 , …), γ k , β k , δ k are vectors of coefficients to be estimated, and ξ mk is an error term. Empirically, (1) is operationalized as a multinomial probit model which is appropriate in our setting because we have multiple, discrete, and unordered alternatives (issue a COC, DOA, or OPP MF, or do not issue a MF).
Multinomial probit model
The empirical version of eq. (1) is estimated using all three MF samples. If our MF classification scheme captures the three underlying reasons for why managers issue MFs in a meaningful way, then the coefficients on one set of independent variables (e.g., DOA m ) will be larger in magnitude and have greater explanatory power in that particular MF sample (e.g., DOA 
where MF_DUM takes the value of 1, 2 or 3 if a given firm-quarter contains a COC MF, DOA MF, or OPP MF, respectively, and zero for quarters without a MF. Here the dependent variable does not reflect any hierarchical measurement properties of the managers' decision to issue MFs.
It simply reflects that managers are likely to have issued a MF for COC, DOA, or OPP reasons, where the ordering of the dependent variable does not reflect any difference in the importance of the choice or whether one choice produced a higher level of utility for the manager.
The independent variables are defined as follows (see Appendix A for details). ERC is the quintile rank of the firm's estimated earnings response coefficient. EARN_SURPRISE is the quintile rank of the absolute value of the difference between the most recent consensus analyst earnings forecast issued prior to three weeks before the end of the fiscal quarter and that issued prior to the actual earnings announcement date of the prior quarter, deflated by price one day before the prior quarter's actual earnings announcement date. In both cases quintile ranks are used to mitigate measurement error. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at the beginning of the quarter. MB is the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the quarter. RTNVOL is the standard deviation of the firm's daily returns. EARNVOL is the 
Determinants of MFs issued for cost of capital incentives
The first nine independent variables in eq. (2) (Kasznik and Lev, 1995) . Managers wishing to maintain a good reputation with investors and satisfy analysts' demand for timely information, issue MFs when the difference between their earnings expectations and those of analysts get large. Hence, the effect of EARN_SURPRISE on MF disclosure is expected to be positive. SIZE is used to capture the incentives of larger firms to issue more frequent MFs due to greater economies of scale in information production, greater demand for information by investors and analysts, or because they face greater litigation risk (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Frankel et al. 1995) . Based on these arguments, the effect of SIZE on MF disclosure is expected to be positive. Following Lennox and Park (2006) 
Determinants of MFs issued to satisfy "disclose or abstain" (DOA) requirements
Managers desiring to trade in their firm's securities and also wishing to satisfy DOA rules will disclose all material nonpublic information prior to trading. The current judicial standard of materiality describes an item as material if there is a "substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available" (TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 1976) .
At least two factors likely affect managers' assessment of materiality: the extent to which the information differs from the market's expectation and the sensitivity of a reasonable investor to a unit of earnings-related news (see. e.g., Heitzman et al. 2010) . We measure the materiality of the managers' private information as follows. EARN_SURPRISE captures the manager's nonpublic information and ERC measures the sensitivity of a reasonable investor to a unit of earningsrelated news. We expect both to be positively related to managers' decision to issue DOA MFs.
Since we cannot observe managers' private information about future earnings unless they disclose it, we assume that the consensus analyst forecast as of 21 days before the end of the quarter is an unbiased estimate of the manager's expectation of the quarter's earnings. To ensure that EARN_SURPRISE is not contaminated by "warnings" or "preannouncements" we use the consensus analyst forecast prior to the last three weeks of the quarter instead of the actual earnings for the quarter.
Note that the two determinants of DOA MFs (EARN_SURPRISE and ERC) are also determinants of COC MFs (see section 5.3.2). Because we cannot identify unique determinants of DOA MFs, in order to validate our MF classification scheme we must rely on the multinomial probit model rather than a simple discrete choice model. Skaife et al. (2010) document that firms with weak internal controls have more significant insider trading profits compared to firms with stronger internal controls. Following Skaife et al. (2010) , we conjecture that managers issuing MFs opportunistically face weaker corporate governance and control systems that serve to permit such behavior. However, attempts to measure the strength of firms' governance systems encounter both empirical and theoretical challenges (see, e.g., Larcker et al. 2007 and Brickley and . Consistent with such concerns, instead of using firm characteristics such as board size to identify "weak" control systems, we use outcome measures. In particular, RESTATE and BACKDATE are our opportunistic determinants of MF disclosure, and are designed to capture firms with weak control systems. Both are expected to be positively related to managers' decision to issue opportunistic MFs and should best explain the issuance of OPP MFs. Since the Wilcoxon test is a test for a difference between the distributions of two samples, the asterisks next to the median value signify a difference in the distributions rather than a difference in the medians. The mean of HABITUAL exceeds 42% in all samples and reflects the tendency of firms to persistently issue MFs as our sample period unfolds. The large mean value of RESTATE is because we assign it a value of one if the firm has a restatement anytime during the 1998-2010 period rather than just having a restatement in the current quarter. Table 3 . For example, if a given variable is predicted to have a positive sign (e.g.,
Determinants of MFs issued opportunistically
Results of estimating the multinomial probit model
ERC) then a ‡ denotes that the estimated coefficient is larger in that sample than in the sample
where that variable is not expected to explain MF issuance. Likewise, if a given coefficient is predicted to be negative, then a ‡ denotes that the estimated coefficient is smaller in that sample than in the sample where it is not expected to explain MF disclosure.
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The findings in Table 5 Panel A reveal that the quintile rank of a firm's ERC is significant in predicting all three types of MFs. If we were able to construct MF samples without misclassification Table 3 predicts ERC to be significant in the COC and DOA MF samples.
Since we noted that misclassifications can occur (see Section 3), our interest lies in comparing the coefficients on ERC (and other independent variables) across samples. Hence, ERC should be more important in explaining MF issuance in the COC and DOA MF samples when compared to OPP sample. Similarly, Table 3 predicts the coefficient on EARN_SURPRISE to be larger in the COC and DOA MF samples when compared to the OPP sample. Consistent with this, we Similarly, BACKDATE is assigned a value of one if a firm was alleged to have engaged in option-grant backdating anytime during the sample period, not just having a back-dating event in the current quarter. 15 Standard errors have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-specific clustering. We do not adjust for timeclustering for three reasons. First, the primary source of potential time clustering is common shocks like new regulations (e.g., Reg FD and SOX). By including year and quarter dummies we absorb such effects making oneway clustering at the firm level appropriate in our setting. That said, one-way clustering by year-quarter leads to similar findings. Second, clustering affects the standard error, but not the coefficient. Since our main focus is a cross-sample comparison of the coefficients, standard errors are less of a concern. Third, presently there is no statistical package capable of computing two-way clustered errors for multinomial probit models.
find that the coefficient on ERC is larger in the COC and DOA samples (0.070 and 0.096) than in the OPP sample (0.067). Also consistent with Table 3 , the coefficient on EARN_SURPRISE is larger in the COC sample (0.056) than in the OPP sample (-0.009). Since the coefficient on EARN_SURPRISE is negative (as opposed to its predicted positive sign) in the DOA sample (-0.001) we do not compare it to with that in the OPP sample. Consistent with this, the results reveal that the coefficient on RESTATE is larger in predicting OPP MFs than in predicting DOA or COC MFs, and the coefficient on BACKDATE is larger in predicting OPP MFs than in predicting COC MFs. Notice that the coefficient on RESTATE in the COC sample and the coefficients on BACKDATE in the DOA MF sample are also statistically different from zero. We interpret these significant coefficients (as well as those on other dependent variables), as an indication of some MF misclassifications in the sub-samples.
With 11 variables in each sample's model and two pair-wise comparisons to make between samples (e.g., COC MFs vs. each of the other two samples), there are 22 coefficient comparisons, where a coefficient comparison is based on the predictions in Table 3 . For example, one comparison involves whether the coefficient on ERC is larger in the DOA sample than in the OPP sample. Ignoring the coefficient comparison involving EARN_SURPRISE in the DOA sample (because it has the wrong sign) leaves 21 coefficient comparisons. Of these, 14 are in the predicted direction (as denoted by a ‡ in Table 5 ). The likelihood of observing 14 out of 21 differences due to chance, where the probability of a difference is 0.50, is 0.095 (one-tailed test). Overall, this evidence is consistent with our MF classification scheme that predicts that variables commonly used in the MF literature exhibit differential explanatory power for managers' decision to issue MFs for COC, DOA, and OPP reasons. Table 5 to be generally consistent with of our MF classification scheme in the sense that a given variable's ability to predict managers' issuance of MFs varies across samples in predictable ways based on their various incentives for issuing earnings guidance. While the evidence in Table 5 provides some assurance that our MF classification scheme is capturing what we intend it to, the evidence in Table 5 also indicates that the approach misclassifies a number of MFs as evidenced by the coefficients on some variables differing from zero in samples where they should theoretically be zero (i.e., where they should not explain MF issuance).
Panel B of
Even though firms adopting ex ante commitment policies to disclose MFs do so for the same economic incentives as postulated for ex post COC MFs, such firms' MFs could differ conceptually from other MFs we classify as COC MFs. To address this concern, we redid the univariate tests in Table 4 and multinomial probit tests in Table 5 after excluding firms we identified as potentially having an ex ante commitment policy to disclose MFs. To identify such firms we adopt the methodology proposed in Tang (2011) . Specifically, for a given firm in a given year t, we remove all of the firm's quarterly observations if the pattern of the firm's MFs in year t is identical to the pattern of MFs in year t-1. For example, if in years t and t+1 a firm issued MFs in quarters 2, 3 and 4, then all 4 of the firm's quarters in year t+1 are excluded from the sample. This led to deleting roughly 25% of the MFs classified as DOA, COC, and OPP and about 60% of the firm-quarters with no MFs. When we repeat the analysis in Tables 4 and 5 the results are similar. For example, as in our previous findings, four of the six Wald tests in Table 5 Panel B are statistically significant at the 10% level. In addition, since HABITUAL may also capture a commitment to a disclosure policy, we repeated the analysis after excluding it. Our original inferences are robust when HABITUAL is excluded.
As a final robustness test we re-estimated the multinomial probit model using only bundled MF firm-quarters, and then only unbundled MF firm-quarters (firm-quarters containing BOTH "bundled" and "unbundled" MFs are excluded from these models, but were included in Table 5 's models). Un-tabulated results using only bundled MF firm-quarters reveal that three of the six Wald tests reject the null hypothesis compared to four of six originally in Table 5 .
Beyond that, the coefficient comparisons are similar to those reported earlier in Table 5 . Untabulated results using only unbundled MF firm-quarters show that two of the six Wald tests are significant and that 13 out of 20 coefficient comparisons are in the predicted direction. While the Wald test results for unbundled MFs are weaker than those originally reported in Table 5 , this is likely due to having fewer MF firm-quarters containing only unbundled MFs (3,897 unbundled MF firm-quarters vs. 12,692 MF firm-quarters in Table 5 ). Overall, the un-tabulated results indicate that Table 5 's results are not driven by either bundled or unbundled MFs. Since the number of correct coefficient tests is similar across models using either just bundled or unbundled MFs, we conclude that the inferences from our main tests are reasonably robust to "bundled" and "unbundled" MFs.
Second construct validity test of the MF classification scheme: Replication of Cheng and Lo (2006)
Our second construct validity test of the MF classification scheme is based on a replication of Cheng and Lo (2006) (CL). We chose this study for three reasons: it is fairly recent and well-cited, it is closely related to our study in that it examines opportunistic MFs and insider trading, and we had access to the same data sources. CL (2006) A concern may arise that our results are mechanical because our classification scheme identifies OPP MFs primarily from step Oa in Table 1 . Oa classifies a MF as opportunistic if there are insider purchases in the 30 days prior to a "good news" MF or insider sales in the 30 days prior to a "bad news" MF. However, the second-stage CL (2006) regression and our replication are based on predicted insider purchases and sales estimated from prior information.
Hence, our classification scheme (based on concurrent insider trading) is unlikely to introduce a mechanical relationship. In addition, the model's change specification further mitigates concerns about any mechanical effect.
To summarize, our replication of CL (2006) yields two important conclusions. First, our MF classification scheme leads to more powerful tests of the incentives underlying specific reasons for why managers issue MFs. Second, inferences drawn from studies (e.g., CL, 2006 in particular) that assume all MFs were issued for one reason (and which ignore the other reasons)
can result in incorrect inferences
Third construct validity test of the MF classification scheme: Predictive ability of the insider trading associated with DOA MFs and OPP MFs
The third validity test of our MF classification scheme relies on prior research on the ability of insider trading to predict future stock price performance (see, e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001 and Seyhun 1992) . This literature finds that insider trading tends to predict future firm performance in that insider purchases are generally associated with higher future stock returns than insider sales. We examine the predictive ability of DOA MFs and OPP MFs for future stock returns. If our approach to classify MFs as DOA captures MFs issued by managers motivated by a desire to release material nonpublic information prior to trading, such insider trading should exhibit no predictive ability for future stock returns. Similarly, if our approach to classify MFs as opportunistic actually captures opportunism, then the insider trading associated with such MFs should exhibit predictive ability for future stock returns. We exclude COC MFs from these predictive ability tests because 82.9% of such MFs have no insider trading in interval [-30 to +30] (see Table 1 ).
To test our predictions, we start with all DOA and OPP MFs identified in Table 1 . For each DOA and OPP MF we calculate the net insider trading during the window that was relevant for assigning that MF to its respective sample. For example, for DOA MFs, and OPP MFs in the Ob and Oc subgroups, the window is trading days +1 to +30 after the MF's release. For OPP MFs in the Oa subgroup, the window is trading days -30 to -1 before the MF's release. We then classify a MF as an insider purchase (sale) if the net trading during the window is purchase (sale). Future abnormal stock returns (CAR) are calculated as the raw buy-and-hold return minus the buy-and-hold return of the corresponding Fama-French 25 portfolios formed on the basis of size and book-to-market ratio. Year +1 is the first 12 months (year +2 is the first 24 months) subsequent to the [-30, +30] trading window centered on the MF's release. We drop observations if future CAR data is unavailable and we winzorize CAR at the top and bottom 1%.
We test the difference between insider purchase and sale groups using a Wilcoxon test. If insider trading associated with OPP MFs has predictive power for future performance the difference in CAR between insider purchases and sales should be positive.
The results reported in Table 7 are based on a sample of 6,067 DOA MFs and 3,580 OPP
MFs for the period 1998-2008. We end in 2008 due to the 24-month holding return period. Given the well-documented skewness in returns, we report median values of CAR in the first and second year subsequent to the [-30 ,+30] window centered on the MF's release separately for insider purchases and sales, as well as test for a difference between the two. Focusing on DOA MFs, if the direction of insider trading can predict future performance, we should observe significant positive differences in future CAR between insider purchases and sales. Contrary to this, neither the 12-month nor the 24-month return differences are significantly positive. Turning to OPP MFs, the difference in median CARs between insider purchases and sales are significantly positive in both Year +1 and Year +2 (differences = 6.41% and 9.08%, respectively). Overall, Table 7 's results provide further empirical evidence that our classification of OPP MFs captures those issued by managers motivated by a desire to trade opportunistically in their firm's securities, whereas there is no difference in future CAR between insider purchases and sales following MFs classified as DOA.
Fourth construct validity test of the MF classification scheme: Replication of Ajinkya et al. (2005)
As a final test of our MF classification scheme we replicate Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and
Sengupta (2005) (ABS) to demonstrate how the results of a published study could be affected by recognizing the alternative rationales for managers to issue MFs that are examined in our study.
We chose ABS (2005) because it is another fairly recent paper and well-cited paper, and we had access to the same or comparable data. ABS (2005) Table 8 reports the results of our replication. Column (2) reproduces the findings in column (1) of Table 3 in ABS. Our replication using all MFs is reported in column (3). In general, most of the t-statistics on the coefficients in our probit model are reasonably consistent with those reported in ABS (2005) 
Conclusions
The disclosure literature identifies several primary reasons why managers issue earnings guidance: to facilitate access to capital markets at lower cost; to comply with Rule 10b-5 of the securities laws whereby managers (i.e., insiders) must disclose material nonpublic information or abstain from trading in their firm's securities (DOA); to trade opportunistically in their firm's securities; and to reduce the expected costs of shareholder class action litigation.
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While the literature recognizes that managers face a variety of incentives to issue guidance, most empirical studies focus on one rationale and thereby assume all MFs are disclosed for that reason. In effect, previous papers pool all MFs and assume only one reason is motivating disclosure. The primary research question we investigate is: "Should Guidance Be
Pooled?" To address this question we use the primary rationales for why managers issue earnings guidance (capital market incentives, compliance with the 10b-5 DOA rules, and opportunistic trading motives) to develop an approach that classifies MFs into samples based on the likely incentive managers faced for issuing a particular MF. Our approach uses properties of the data such as insider trading around the MF's release, characteristics of the MF, the market reaction to the MF, and the MF forecast error to classify MFs. We find that roughly 63% of MFs are issued due to capital market incentives, 23% are issued to comply with the 10b-5 DOA rule, and 14% are opportunistic.
Four sets of empirical tests are used to validate our method. In the first we hypothesize that each of the three explanations to issue MFs has a set of independent variables that best explains whether that particular type of MF will be disclosed in a given firm quarter, and moreover, that those variables will differ in their explanatory power across MF classifications.
We estimate a multinomial probit model to examine the factors associated with managers' MF_DUM takes the value of 1, 2 or 3 if a given firm-quarter is classified into the COC, DOA, or OPP MF sample, respectively, and zero for firm-quarters without a MF. The MF must be issued during the period from the earnings announcement date of the last quarter up to one day before the current quarter's earnings announcement date.
ERC is the quintile rank of the firm's earnings response coefficient. We estimate a firm-specific ERC for each firm-quarter by regressing two-day (i.e., day 0 and +1) earnings announcement period market-adjusted returns on unexpected earnings using the 16 most recent quarters (complete data is required for all 16 quarters). Unexpected earnings is actual EPS minus the most recent consensus analyst earnings forecast issued prior to the earnings announcement date, deflated by stock price on day -1 relative to the earnings announcement date. Quintile ranks are used to mitigate measurement error.
EARN_SURPRISE is the quintile rank of the absolute value of the difference between the most recent consensus analyst earnings forecast issued prior to three weeks before the end of the fiscal quarter and that issued prior to the earnings announcement date of the prior quarter, deflated by stock price on day -1 relative to the prior quarter's earnings announcement date. Quintile ranks are used to mitigate measurement error.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at the beginning of the quarter.
MB is the firm's market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the quarter.
RTNVOL is the standard deviation of the firm's daily stock return over the 250 trading days before the beginning of the quarter (a minimum of 100 trading days required).
EARNVOL is the standard deviation of the seasonal change in quarterly EPS scaled by assets per share as of the beginning of the quarter based on the 16 most recent quarters of data (complete data is required for all 16 quarters). [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . The dependent variable is an ordinal variable that takes value 1, 0, or -1 if the net news frequency in the current quarter is higher than, equal to, or lower than the net news frequency in the last quarter, respectively. The net news frequency is defined as the number of good news MFs minus the number of bad news MFs issued during a quarter. We classify a MF as good news or bad news based on the sign of the three-day size-adjusted return around the MF. Column (2) uses all MFs while columns (3), (4), and (5) use only COC, DOA, and OPP MFs, respectively. See section 3 and Table 1 for a description of the process used to assign MFs to the COC, DOA, and OPP samples. The predicted IP (IS) is the expected insider purchases (insider sales) estimated from a first-stage model where the amount of insider trading for the current quarter is regressed on determinants (i.e., firm size, growth opportunities, stock returns, ROE, option grants, insider trading) measured from the prior quarter (see Cheng and Lo, 2006) . To be consistent with Cheng and Lo (2006) we include trades by all directors and officers. "RET Indicator" is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if a firm's abnormal return during the quarter is positive, and zero otherwise. "Change in RET Indicator" is the difference between the current quarter and last quarter's RET Indicator. "Future change in RET Indicator" is the difference between the leading one quarter and current quarter's "RET Indicator." The table reports the mean coefficients and pseudo R 2 from 30 quarterly ordered logit regressions. Z-statistics are calculated using the Fama-MacBeth approach with a Newey-West correction for serial correlation at two lags. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, one-tailed tests. Table 1 for a description of the process used to assign MFs to the COC, DOA, and OPP groups. Following Ajinkya et al. (2005) OUTDIR is the portion of directors that are not officers of the firm, INST is the portion of institutional ownership, LMVAL is logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year, AUDIT is an indicator variable for Big 5 auditors, NUMEST is the number of analysts following the firm, DISPFOR is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts deflated by the median forecast, LITGATE is an indicator variable for high litigation risk industries (i.e., SIC 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961) , MKBK is the book to market ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year, LOSS is an indicator variable for loss firms, NEWS is an indicator variable for profit-declining firms, EARNVOL is the standard deviation of earnings over the previous 12 quarters deflated by median asset value, BETA is the equity beta estimated over the fiscal year, and FD is an indicator variable for the post-Reg FD period. As in Ajinkya et al. (2005) 
Cheng and Lo (2006)
